LSU Journal of Energy Law and Resources
Volume 6
Issue 2 Spring 2018
6-6-2018

Pride and ‘Prejudice to the Environment’: An Application ofTRIPS
Article 27.2 to Genetically Modified Seeds
Virginia L. Brown

Repository Citation
Virginia L. Brown, Pride and ‘Prejudice to the Environment’: An Application ofTRIPS Article 27.2 to
Genetically Modified Seeds, 6 LSU J. of Energy L. & Resources (2018)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jelr/vol6/iss2/13

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Journal of Energy Law and Resources by an authorized editor
of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

Pride and ‘Prejudice to the Environment’: An
Application of TRIPS Article 27.2 to Genetically
Modified Seeds
“Where there is a real superiority of mind, pride will be always under
good regulation.”1
- JANE AUSTEN
INTRODUCTION
In the small village of Capulalpan, located in the foothills of the
Mexican state of Oaxaca, production of native corn varieties is an
important cultural activity.2 Around the turn of the century, village elders
discovered a wild strain of corn that was invading their native “Creole”
crops.3 Though it has been illegal since 1998 to cultivate genetically
modified (GM) corn within Mexico, the country still imports GM corn for
human consumption.4 Biologists tested the DNA5 of this wild strain in
2002 and discovered it was genetically modified.6 Genetically altered corn
had been delivered to villages on trucks, so the natives assumed that
kernels fell off the trucks during their journey and started to grow
wherever they landed.7 The GM corn quickly took over the native crops.
According to Antonio Serratos of the Mexico-based International Center
for the Improvement of Maize and Wheat, if a farmer with a one-hectare8
plot plants a single row with this invasive GM seed, sixty-five percent of
the plot will be GM in only seven years.9 Though the genetically modified
corn grew larger and quicker than the native varieties, it was highly

Copyright 2018, by VIRGINIA L. BROWN.
1. JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE (1813).
2. Carmelo Ruiz-Marrero, Genetic Pollution: Biotech Corn Invades Mexico,
CORP WATCH (Mar. 20, 2002), https://perma.cc/JNV8-Y234.
3. Pav Jordan, Mysterious ‘Alien’ Corn Invades Mexico Countryside, INST.
FOR AGRIC.& TRADE POL’Y (Jan. 30, 2002), https://perma.cc/7LKT-XEMZ.
4. Id.
5. Genes are units of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) which encode the
necessary information for cells to reproduce and to produce specific proteins.
6. Jordan, supra note 3.
7. Id.
8. A hectare is a unit of measurement in the metric system, equivalent to
10,000 square meters, or 2.471 acres. Hectare, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://perma.cc/AZL4-7MH8 (last visited Dec. 19, 2017).
9. Ruiz-Marrero, supra note 2.
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susceptible to the diseases once ripe.10 Scientists and environmentalists are
concerned the transgenic corn could completely usurp the Creole variety,
which has become largely resistant to local plagues and diseases.11 The
uncontrollable nature of genetically modified crops is no longer
speculative. Once released into the wild, it is almost impossible to track
these crops as they crossbreed with other varieties.
Now consider if the crop in Mexico12 had been genetically modified to
contain “terminator technology,” which is a suicide mechanism inserted into
seeds that causes them to terminate upon completion of the first production
cycle.13 Inventors developed this trait with the purpose of protecting their
rights in the patented seeds, as it would force farmers to return to the seller
each year for new seed. Once released into the environment, this technology
could be passed through interbreeding with the native varieties and
eventually eliminate a major native food source. Mexico, a nation that has
consciously taken steps to ban all GM crops but not GM commodities, could
still fall victim to the vast negative environmental impact caused by these
seeds. Borders and legislation cannot keep genetically modified seeds out of
the country. The international spread of this dangerous terminator
technology must be stopped before it is too late.
Countries all around the world share the responsibilities of care and
preservation of the environment. When faced with the choice of protecting
the future environment versus encouraging innovation and progress through
issuance of patents, countries should turn to the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) for guidance.
Enacted in 1997, this Agreement completely changed the landscape of
international intellectual property rights.14 TRIPS regulates the patenting
of life forms through Article 27, which sets forth general provisions
regarding patentable subject matter and three subparagraphs describing
exemptions:15 “Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents
10. The reliance on a single crop of one genetic makeup may make the same
crop more vulnerable to disease. If a plague wipes out this single crop, it can
devastate a society. This occurred during the Irish potato famine in 1845; more
recently in the United States, blight hit many cornfields with certain hybrid varieties
of corn producing only half of projected yields. David Daniel, Seeds of Hope: How
New Genetic Technologies May Increase Value to Farmers, Seed Companies, and
the Developing World, 36 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 250, 260 (2010).
11. Jordan, supra note 3.
12. MARGARET MELLON & JANE RISSLER, GONE TO THE SEED:
TRANSGENICCONTAMINANTS IN THE TRADITIONAL SEED SUPPLY 45, 47 (2004).
13. Daniel, supra note 10.
14. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art.
27, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
15. Id.
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shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all
fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step
and are capable of industrial application ”16
Most relevant to the issue at hand is Article 27.2, which provides some
exclusions from patentability. The words of this clause are vague, and the
standard is muddled; overall, this clause raises many practical questions.17
Yet, one point is clear: member nations have the authority to refuse to
grant patents to environmentally risky inventions.18
Members may exclude inventions from patentability within their
territories if preventing the commercial exploitation of those inventions is
necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human,
animal, or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment,
provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is
prohibited by their law.19
Article 27.2 allows concerned countries to discourage the development
of dangerous terminator technology,20 while still incentivizing the creation
of beneficial GM agriculture. As countries take advantage of this provision,
they will hopefully encourage more countries to follow suit. Cooperation
among concerned countries is necessary because the mitigation of
environmental damage is not a job that can be completed within the borders
of a single country. Through use of Article 27.2, countries can encourage
companies to develop more beneficial GM crops, while discouraging the
production of terminator technology.
In interpreting the TRIPS Article 27.2 exceptions to patentability, a
bright-line rule should be implemented that classifies genetically modified
crops inserted with terminator technology as inherently “prejudicial to the
environment.” This rule would allow all Member States to refuse such
patents without further analysis, which would protect the long-term status
of the environment. Not all genetically modified organisms are fully
understood by the scientific community, but there is plenty of evidence that
destruction could be caused by GM crops embedded with terminator
technology as they spread uncontrollably through cross-pollination.
16. Id.
17. M. Bruce Harper, TRIPS Article 27.2: An Argument for Caution, 21 WM.
& MARY ENVTL. L.& POL’Y REV. 381, 383 (1997).
18. Id. at 383-84.
19. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14.
20. Biotechnology companies recently developed a direct intellectual
property enforcement mechanism referred to as “terminator” technology that
causes plants to effectively self-destruct at the end of their cycle. See Debra M.
Strauss, The Application of TRIPS to GMOs: International Intellectual Property
Rights and Biotechnology, 45 STAN. J. INT’L L. 287, 299 (2009).
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Part I of this article will lay out the foundation of genetically modified
organisms and terminator technology. Part II will examine the patent system
and how it offers incentives for inventors. Part III will outline the history of
TRIPS Article 27.2 and its purpose. Part IV will discuss interpretation of
Article 27.2, with emphasis on the phrase “serious prejudice to the
environment,” and apply the interpretation to genetically modified crops.
Part V will suggest solutions that promote the protection of the environment,
including a proposed bright-line rule regarding the interpretation of Article
27.2. Implementation of this standard is urgent: humans may have a moral
obligation to protect the environment for future generations.
I. GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS
A. An Introduction to Genetically Modified Crops
Hungarian engineer Kal Ereky coined the term “biotechnology” in
191921 and paved the way for the discovery of the DNA double helix in
1953.22 His research also led to the development of recombinant DNA23
technologies in the 1970s; these events formed the cornerstones of modern
biotechnology.24 In 1989, Australia was the first nation in the world to
approve the sale of a genetically modified organism.25 Over time, the
introduction of GM products into the daily lives of many Americans has
increased exponentially. By 2016, ninety-three percent of cotton, ninetyfour percent of soybean, and ninety-two percent of corn acreage in the
United States was genetically modified.26

21. Policy Brief: Modern Biotechnology and the OECD, OECD OBSERVER
(Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev.), June 1999, https://perma.cc/6YEE-6NEW.
22. See Leslie G. Restaino et al., Patenting DNA-Related Inventions in the
European Union, United States and Japan: A Trilateral Approach or a Study in
Contrast?, 2 UCLA J. L. & TECH. 1 (2003).
23. Recombinant DNA is a molecule consisting of segments of DNA from
different genomes that have been joined end-to-end outside of living cells and have
the capacity to infect some host cell being maintained therein. Anthony J.F.
Griffiths, Recombinant DNA Technology, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://per
ma.cc/KWE8-6HB9 (last visited Dec. 19, 2017).
24. Restaino et al., supra note 22.
25. Carlos Scott Lopez, Intellectual Property Reform for Genetically Modified
Crops: A Legal Imperative, 20 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 367, 370 (2004).
26. Recent Trends in GE Adoption, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV.,
https://perma.cc/AP5G-6F63 (last updated July 12, 2017).
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1. Benefits of Genetically Modified Crops
There are vast potential benefits to the use of GM crops: more productive
harvests, improved food quality—such as vitamin-enriched products, and
decreased dependence on environmentally dangerous chemicals and
pesticides.27 Higher quality crops, including those genetically modified to
resist disease, can be produced in greater quantities, more than meeting
market demand and leading to decreased hunger.28
Concerns about environmental impacts of GM foods have tended to
be regulated by applying or adapting existing provisions of environmental
law.29 Today, many crops are genetically modified to be resistant to pests,
grow more quickly, and produce higher yields.30 Because they often
require fewer natural resources to grow, these crops are also less taxing on
the environment.31 Yet, a heated debate continues regarding whether planting
genetically modified crops actually increases yields. For example, a 2008
article published in Britain's The Independent referenced an authoritative new
study demonstrating that genetically modified soy produced ten percent less
food than the non-genetically modified variety.32 However, no conclusive
scientific evidence has surfaced to indicate significant health or environmental
threats unique to GM crops.33
27. Henrique Freire de Oliviera Souza, Genetically Modified Plants: A Need
for International Regulation,6 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 129, 138 (2000).
28. See George E.C. York, Global Foods, Local Tastes and Biotechnology:
The New Legal Architecture of International Agricultural Trade, 7 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 423, 429 (2001).
29. Dr. Andrew W. Torrance, Intellectual Property as the Third Dimension
of GMO Regulation, 16 KAN. J.L.& PUB. POL’Y 257, 262 (2007).
30. Julie Teel, Rapporteur's Summary of the Deliberative Forum: Have
NGOs Distorted or Illuminated the Benefits and Hazards of Genetically Modified
Organisms?, 13 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 137, 146 (2002).
31. Lopez, supra note 25, at 375.
32. Geoffrey Lean, Exposed: The Great GM Crops Myth, INDEPENDENT, Apr.
19, 2008, https://perma.cc/7TSQ-5P4G.
33. Torrance, supra note 29, at 271 n.77; see, e.g., Philip J. Dale et al., Potential
for the Environmental Impact of Transgenic Crops, 20 NATURE BIOTECH. 567
(2002). Evolutionary theory suggests that the probabilities of GM organisms
spreading their genes into natural populations are very low. Given the rigors of
natural selection, and the unlikelihood that human tinkering will be superior to
millions of years of evolution at selecting genetic traits advantageous for survival
and reproduction, GM organisms will tend to be less, rather than more, likely to
survive in the wild than their unmodified wild cousins. By corollary, any wild
organism to which GM genes do spread will tend to survive less well because of
those GM genes than their purely non-GM wild cousins. Evolutionary theory
suggests that, far from becoming superorganisms that supplant wild biodiversity,
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Biotechnological advances might help to meet the goal of sustainable
development by improving the efficiency of land use and increasing the
amount of available food.34 Some scholars suggest that genetically
engineered crops will reduce world hunger and the likelihood of famine.35
Yet, other experts say that the cause of world hunger is not the overall lack
of food but the lack of accessibility.36 In fact, eighty percent of the people
suffering from hunger live in food-exporting countries.37
2. The Negative Impact of Genetically Modified Organisms
“Genetically modified organism” (GMO) refers to a life form that has
been altered using recombinant DNA techniques.38 Biotechnology and
GMOs may be a double-edged sword involving both promises for
sustainable use or resources through environmentally sound technologies
and perils to biodiversity through unexpected harmful interaction with the
environment.39 Genetic drift most commonly occurs through a process
called outcrossing, in which domesticated plants hybridize with wild
relatives.40 Modified DNA, like any other form of DNA, is transferred to
other plants by cross-pollination.41 Cross-pollination is the biggest
problem, as pollen can stay airborne for hours and be carried by the wind
or insects for distances of several kilometers.42

GM organisms and the genetic material they carry will tend to disappear quickly
after entering natural ecosystems.
34. Yvonne Cripps, Patenting Resources: Biotechnology and the Concept of
Sustainable Development, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 119, 127 (2001).
35. Id. at 121. See ROYAL SOC’Y OF LONDON ET AL., TRANSGENIC PLANTS &
WORLD AGRICULTURE (2000), https://perma.cc/SC6E-RVK8.
36. GMOs: The Wrong Answer to the Wrong Problem, Interview with Rafael
Mariano, Head of the Peasant Movement in the Philippines, in VOICES FROM THE
SOUTH, THE THIRD WORLD DEBUNKS MYTHS ON GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS
6-7 (Ellen Hickey & Anuradha Mittal eds., 2003), https://perma.cc/E5N4-RH7D.
37. Id.
38. Ramesh Karky & Mark Perry, The World Trade Organization Obligations
and Legislative Policy: Choices in Developing Countries for Biotechnology, 22
CURRENTS INT’L TRADE L.J. 13, 14 (2013).
39. Cripps, supra note 34, at 121-23.
40. Daniel, supra note 10, at 262.
41. Id.
42. Peter Straub, Farmers in the IP Wrench – How Patents on Gene-Modified
Crops Violate the Right to Food in Developing Countries, 29 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 190-91 (2006).
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Outcrossing is unavoidable and cannot be stopped by physical barriers
or country borders.43 Sometimes farmers must create buffer areas around
their crops in order to protect non-target crops, but these buffer zones are
not the solution to genetic drift. In some instances, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has concluded that the imposition of buffer
zones is not the most “scientifically appropriate” method for mitigating
the risk of exposure to pesticide drift.44 It only takes one breeding cycle
for crops to stray from expectation.
Another problem is that genetically modified crops are inconsistently
and inadequately managed.45 Specifically, the intellectual property rights
associated with GM crops are often muddled, inconsistent, or unclear,
which could contribute to the interests of key inter-regional, interstate, and
international constituents being either ignored, misunderstood, or
unprotected.46 Genetically modified crops cannot be managed; once they
are released into the environment, the consequences of their uncontrolled
reproduction in the face of decreased biodiversity cannot be predicted.47
Food products are modified for many different purposes such as the
insertion of antibiotic-resistant genes as marker genes during the research
and development process.48 In recent decades, studies have shown that
consumption of animals treated with antibiotics contributes to strains of
antibiotic-resistant bacteria in humans.49 These antibiotic-resistant strains
of bacteria cause humans to become more virulently ill for a longer period
of time than do antibiotic-susceptible bacteria.50 The application of
biotechnology to farming practices may result in a vicious cycle: GM crops
give rise to a contaminated ecological system; the contaminated ecological
system to contaminated agricultural products; contaminated products to
contaminated food; and contaminated food to contaminated human bodies.51
43. Id.
44. See Pesticide Action Network N. Am. v. U.S. EPA, 654 F. App'x 887,
888 (9th Cir. 2016).
45. Lopez, supra note 25, at 369.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 377.
48. Tore Midtvedt, Antibiotic Resistance and Genetically Modified Plants,
Sept. 25, 2014, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4176670/.
49. Ariele Lessing, Killing Us Softly: How Sub-Therapeutic Dosing of
Livestock Causes Drug-Resistant Bacteria in Humans, 37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 463, 464 (2010).
50. Id. at 464-65.
51. Young-Gyoo Shim, Intellectual Property Protection of Biotechnology
and Sustainable Development in International Law, 29 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM.
REG. 157, 206 (2003).
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In many countries, the public has already expressed concerns over the
regulation of biotechnology, particularly GM crops, and the risks of this
technology on health and the environment.52 In this age of globalization
and technology transfer, a recipient nation may receive much more than it
bargained or even wished for when it imports organisms or organic
material from overseas.53 The herbicide-resistant crops may lead to
increased environmental pollution and increased risks to human health.54
Environmentalists argue that it should not be overlooked that diffusions
of GM crops can threaten biological diversity because of their unanticipated
environmentally unfriendly effects.55 While the widespread planting of GM
crops has led to a decrease in pesticide use, there is an upward trend of
herbicide use to prevent weeds.56 Herbicides can be applied broadly and in
significant quantities across wide areas without fear of damage to the crops
in question, but there is a risk of chemical infiltration into water supplies.57
Powerful pesticides can produce undesirable new creatures such as new
resistant pests that humans cannot control and ultimately lead to serious
imbalances in ecology.58 These pesticides pose a significant environmental
problem because large doses of the chemicals can harm biodiversity and
increase water and air pollution over time.59 Most of the long-term effects
of GM crops are uncertain. Pests that are targeted by these agricultural
methods can adapt to pesticides in addition to the DNA changes in GM
plants that make them “resistant.”60 This means that pesticide-resistant
crops will not always be effective, and their toxic legacies could remain.61
Pest-resistant crops often fail to distinguish between harmful and
ecologically desirable insects, and thus cause imbalance in ecosystems.62
Because GM crops are often bred to be resistant or immune to pesticides
and herbicides, farmers feel more free to use these toxic substances, which
52. Karky & Perry, supra note 38, at 20.
53. Cripps, supra note 34, at 126-27. For example, various countries were
concerned about seemingly environmentally sound cattle and cattle embryos
imported from the United Kingdom at the height of the “mad cow” epidemic.
54. Id. at 122.
55. Shim, supra note 51, at 164.
56. Caroline Newman, Largest-Ever Study Reveals Environmental Impact of
Genetically Modified Crops, PHYS.ORG (Sept. 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/2WMJ-LE8S.
57. Cripps, supra note 34, at 122.
58. Lakshman D. Guruswamy, Sustainable Agriculture: Do GMOs Imperil
Biosafety?, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 461, 475-76 (2001).
59. Newman, supra note 56.
60. Emily Glass, The Environmental Impact of GMOs, ONE GREEN PLANET
(Aug. 2, 2013), https://perma.cc/2RC9-X7VT.
61. Id.
62. Cripps, supra note 34, at 122.
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often negatively affect non-target beneficial organisms, such as bees and
butterflies.63 In 1999, a Cornell University study found that GMOs
containing pesticides, such as Bt-corn,64 caused harm to Monarch butterfly
larvae, which are beneficial insects.65 Genetic engineering also leads to the
use of fewer varieties of crops in favor of those deemed most efficient.66
Monoculture also greatly enhances risk from pests and diseases.67
Farmers and consumers, especially in Europe and developing countries,
who worry about genetically modified products’ unidentified hazards to
human health and the environment, among other impacts, often oppose the
extensive introduction of GMOs.68 Thailand has extended a ban on all
GMOs and decided to maintain the ban until national biosafety regulations
are developed.69 India has limited cultivation of GM cottonseeds since 2002
and postponed Bt-eggplant cultivation until it is proven safe for human
health and the environment.70 There is doubt as to these developing
countries’ ability to conduct thorough risk assessments of GM products.71
Without the promise of exclusivity, no biotechnology company would
have the financial incentive to commit to research and development.72
There is evidence that allowing such patents inevitably creates monopolies
of biotech companies, which hampers scientific progress and is therefore
not in the public interest.73 When inventors—including universities—have
a direct financial stake in the outcome of their research, this patent protection
63. Glass, supra note 60.
64. Bacillus thuringiensis (“Bt”) is a naturally-occurring bacterium found in
soil that possesses an unusual property: it produces a protein that kills certain cropdestroying insects. While the Bt protein is a natural pesticide, it is not harmful to
humans, animals, or beneficial insects like bees and ladybugs. Monsanto Co. v.
Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 133, 140 (D. Del. 1999).
65. Carol Kaesuk Yoon, Altered Corn May Imperil Butterfly, Researchers
Say, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/20/us/alteredcorn-may-imperil-butterfly-researchers-say.html.
66. Cripps, supra note 34, at 122.
67. Id.
68. Shim, supra note 51, at 177.
69. Karky & Perry, supra note 38, at 17-18; See GMO Update: US-EU Biotech
Dispute; EU Regulations; Thailand, BIORES (Sept. 10, 2004), https://perma.cc/7Q
4A-X8N4.
70. India Puts on Hold First GM Food Crop on Safety Grounds, BBC NEWS
(Feb. 9, 2010), https://perma.cc/5NK5-8JL2.
71. Karky & Perry, supra note 38, at 18.
72. Strauss, supra note 20, at 302.
73. Id.; see FOOD SAFETY DEP’T, WORLD HEALTH ORG., MODERN FOOD
BIOTECHNOLOGY, HUMAN HEALTH & DEVELOPMENT: AN EVIDENCE-BASED
STUDY 55 (2005), https://perma.cc/YWC9-ESJC.
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may discourage the inventors’ inquiry into the risks of their developed
technology. This practice can potentially divert research from sustainability
and environmentally friendly alternatives.74
B. Terminator Technology
In 1998, Delta and Pine Land Company (D&PL) and the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) acquired a patent for a genetically
modified seed called Technology Protection System.75 This became
known as “terminator technology.”76 Terminator technology77 is a
genetically engineered suicide mechanism that causes the next generation
of a seed to self-destruct through self-poisoning.78 This technology can
replace the “technology agreement” that seed manufacturers, such as the
powerhouse Monsanto, require farmers to sign.79 Terminator technology
works by creating lots of toxic protein in the embryo of the seed that will
kill the cells of the plant’s seeds.80

74. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 200-211 (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 401 (1989); 45 C.F.R. § 650
(1992).
75. Samantha M. Ohlgart, The Terminator Gene: Intellectual Property Rights
vs. The Farmer’s Common Law Right to Save Seed, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 473
(2002). See U.S. Patent No. 5,723,765 (issued Mar. 3, 1998).
76. Strauss, supra note 20.
77. Id. This technology has since been purchased by Monsanto. U.S. Patent
No. 5,977,441 (filed Nov. 2, 1999); U.S. Patent No. 5,925,808 (filed July 20,
1999); U.S. Patent No. 5,723, 765 (filed Mar. 3, 1998).
78. Ohlgart, supra note 75.
79. A Technology Agreement must be signed by farmers prior to seed
purchases for a range of crops and Monsanto patents. It is described as a “limited
license” between the grower and Monsanto to use RR soybeans, etc. The grower
agrees to: (1) Acquire seed only from a seed company licensed by Monsanto; (2)
Use seed “solely for planting a single commercial crop;” (3) “Not to save or clean
any crop produced from Seed for planting, not to supply Seed produced from Seed
to anyone for planting, not to plant seed for [seed] production” and; (4) Not to
plant or transfer “for crop breeding, research, or generation of herbicide
registration data.” See Monsanto Technology/Stewardship Agreement, Monsanto
(2011), https://perma.cc/MZE9-TK5R (providing, at clause 14, the several patents
to which the farmers were to be bound).
80. Martha Crouch, How the Terminator Terminates: An Explanation for the
Non-Scientist of a Remarkable Patent for Killing Second-Generation Seeds of
Crop Plants, EDMONDS INSTITUTE (Revised ed. 1998), https://perma.cc/S3RKRL2J. The preferred toxin is the ribosome inhibitor protein because it is non-toxic
to organisms other than plants. Id.
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1. History of Terminator Seeds
Previously, farmers relied on saved seeds with the most beneficial
characteristics for the production of the next year’s crop, a right given to
them by the Plant Variety Protections Act.81 In its decision in Asgrow Seed
Co. v. Winterboer, the 1995 U.S. Supreme Court narrowed this common
law right to save seeds to only cover farmers who saved seeds to replant
on his or her own property.82 Since the terminator gene does not allow a
seed to germinate, the farmers that plant those seeds can no longer save
any to replant next season.83
In 1998, Monsanto agreed to buy D&PL, then withdrew its application
and instead announced that it would not use the terminator technology.84
Monsanto made this decision in response to insistent protests by farmers,
environmental groups, and development agencies. Terminator technology
would have severe consequences on farmers around the world, especially
those in developing countries who depend on saving seeds to replant from
year to year.85
Other companies, such as Pioneer Hi-Bred, Rhone Poulenc, and
DuPont, have developed similar techniques to produce sterile seeds.86
With the recent news of the merger of Monsanto and Bayer,87 along with
some other biotech companies, there is little doubt that the initial promises
not to deploy terminator seeds have been overthrown by new realities.88
81. Plant Variety Protection Act, 91 Pub. L. No. 577, § 113, (84 Stat. 1542);
see also Jeremy P. Oczek, In the Aftermath of the “Terminator” Technology
Controversy: Intellectual Property Protections for Genetically Engineered Seeds
and the Right to Save and Replant Seeds, 41 B.C. L. REV 627, 647 (2000).
82. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995).
83. Ohlgart, supra note 75.
84. Yves Savidan, Terminator Genes: Fertility Rights, THE ECONOMIST, Oct.
9, 1999, at 104. At the time the announcement was made, Monsanto's Chief
Executive Officer explained that “Though we do not own any sterile seed
technology, we think it is important to respond . . . by making clear our commitment
not to commercialize gene protection systems that render seed sterile.”
85. Paul Brown, Monsanto Drops GM “Terminator,” THE GUARDIAN (Oct.
4, 1999), https://perma.cc/GKF5-RUFL.
86. Ohlgart, supra note 75.
87. Krishnadev Calamur, Bayer and Monsanto’s Mega Merger, THE
ATLANTIC, Sept. 14, 2016, https://perma.cc/ZK47-FREY.
88. Ikechi Mgbeoji, The “Terminator” Patent and Its Discontents:
Rethinking the Normative Deficit in Utility Test of Modern Patent Law, 17 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 95, 121 n.111 (2004).
Two new terminator patents that were applied for and issued after the
promises were made include: US Patent 6,297,426, issued October 2,
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As the use of genetically modified seeds has increased and the development
of these seeds has become more competitive, large manufacturers have
realized there is more long-term value in the use of terminator technology.89
A Monsanto spokesperson claimed that the technology is simply “a way to
protect their [company’s] billions of dollars of investment into research on
biologically-engineered products.”90
2. Purpose of Terminator Seeds
While patents are generally designed to transfer valuable information
to the public after the duration of the patent term, terminator seeds ensure
that the ultimate control of the genetic traits of the patented life form
remains in the hands of the seed developer, at least until the patent
expires.91 Because the seeds cannot reproduce, this technology ensures
that a farmer cannot use the seed for his own crop and also sell the seed
for a profit. This mechanism encourages manufacturers to spend more time
and money developing new and helpful farming techniques, but in the long
term, farmers suffer harm because they have to rely more heavily on
technology developers to supply their seed. While this technology may be
beneficial for the manufacturers that develop it, the effects of these seeds
reach farther than the farmers that plant them. Spreading of these seeds
through common cross-pollination could have a catastrophic impact on the
global food supply.92 If the terminator gene is crossbred with conventional
crop varieties through outcrossing, the gene could wipe out entire fields.

2001 and US Patent 6,228,643, issued May 8, 2001. According to the
ETC Group, the former describes “the identification and inactivation of
a native gene critical to female fertility. This gene is cloned, linked to an
inducible promoter and inserted into the plant. The result is a plant that
is functionally female sterile with inducible female fertility. This
approach involves chemical control of female fertility and its extension
to other seed lines ….” Id. Another concern about terminator patents is
that they probably help to consolidate the seed industry in a few powerful
conglomerates such as Monsanto, Mycogen, Novartis. However, there is
considerable debate on whether such consolidation is necessarily
harmful to society.
89. Haley Stein, Intellectual Property and Genetically Modified Seeds: The
United States, Trade, and the Developing World,3 NW. J. TECH.& INTELL. PROP.
160, 168 (2005).
90. Id.
91. Mgbeoji, supra note 88, at 97.
92. Strauss, supra note 20, at 300 n.89.
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3. Recent Reactions to Terminator Technology
In 2000, the United Nations’ Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD)
implemented a de facto moratorium on sterile seed technologies under the
term “Genetic Use Restriction Technologies” (GURTs).93 In 2006, parties
voted to extend the moratorium.94 Despite pressures over time from Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and from the biotechnology
industry as a whole, the CBD has nevertheless maintained its stance.95 Yet,
a large and growing body of scientific studies into the human health and
environmental safety of GMOs and GM crops has failed to reveal significant
justification for the extreme precautionary approach adopted by the United
Nations.96 There is a fear that the moratorium will not last much longer,
especially as long as the United States continues to pressure the UN; a longterm solution is needed.
In 2000, a group of more than three hundred scientists voiced concern
about genetically modified seed plants, as well as related terminator
technology, in a letter to the Fifth Conference of the Parties (COP)
Convention on Biological Diversity, stating: “we call for the immediate
suspension of the release of [terminator] crops and products, both
commercially and in open field trials.”97 Numerous environmental nongovernmental organizations condemned the technology as a threat to
agricultural food security.98 Some countries such as India, Ghana, and
Panama have gone so far as to take steps to place a moratorium on the socalled terminator seed technology in their own countries.99 Even the USDA,
which was a former developer of terminator technology, was instructed by
the Clinton Administration to discourage further terminator research.100

93. Id. at 300.
94. Mario Osava, Ban on Terminator Seed Field Trials Continues, INTER
PRESS SERVICE (Mar. 24, 2006), https://perma.cc/5FVL-C6WT.
95. Strauss, supra note 20, at 300. See also UN Upholds Moratorium on
Terminator Seed Technology, ETC GROUP (Mar. 31, 2006), https://perma.cc
/KPY3-BCQV.
96. Torrance, supra note 29, at 284.
97. Wandera Ojanji, Suspend GM Crops for Five Years - Scientists, THE
EAST AFRICAN, May 29, 2000.
98. Nigel Hawkes, War on Killer Seed, TIMES, Nov. 4, 1998; See also Rob
Edwards, US Officials Fear a Backlash Over ‘Terminator Technology,' NEW
SCIENTIST, 2121, Feb. 14, 1998.
99. Press Release, ETC Group, Traitor Resolutions? (June 25, 1999),
https://perma.cc/E9Q6-FZGV; Hawkes, supra note 98; See also Edwards, supra
note 98.
100. Edwards, supra note 98.
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C. The Benefits and the Burdens of Balancing Crops with Terminator
Technology
There are two main benefits to terminator seeds: incentivizing
research and reducing the need for contracts.
1. Benefits of Terminator Seeds
Plant breeders benefit from increased appropriation of research benefits
from new products.101 Terminator seeds may increase productivity from
improved inputs due to increased research and development investment.102
Also, there is evidence of increased agricultural productivity.103 Terminator
technology seeds enable farmers to activate or deactivate genetic traits
such as disease resistance.104 The self-destruct mechanism embedded in
each plant containing the terminator demonstrates the essence of corporate
domination over these natural resources and may offer better monopoly
control than patents.105
Part of the attraction of terminator seeds for biotechnological seed
merchants is that they dispense with the need for license agreements and
end-user contracts between seed merchants and farmers.106 Until recently,
the U.S. Department of Agriculture not only freely developed and
distributed seeds but also encouraged farmers to save seeds.107 Seed saving
is an ingrained part of agriculture, and today over eighty percent of farmers
in developing nations rely on saved seeds for survival.108 In fact, the
American agriculture industry is built upon sharing seeds from around the
world.109 Yet, the introduction of terminator technology effectively
eliminates the opportunity for farmers to save seed. Without the ability to
save seeds, farmers in developing countries lose a large part of their
livelihood.

101. Mgbeoji, supra note 88, at 103.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Derek Eaton et al., Economic and Policy Aspects of “Terminator'
Technology, 49 BIOTECHNOLOGY & DEV. MONITOR 19-22 (2002).
105. Strauss, supra note 20, at 301.
106. Mgbeoji, supra note 88, at 114.
107. Oczek, supra note 81, at 631.
108. Ohlgart, supra note 75.
109. Oczek, supra note 81, at 631.
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2. Harms of Terminator Seeds
There are both moral and health-related downsides to this technology.
Risks of terminator seeds include risks of misuse of technology by plant
breeders, danger of corporate vertical integration, increased risk of seed
insecurity, impediment to access to genetic improvements, and genetic
pollution and sterilization of otherwise fertile seeds.110 The Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations’ Panel of Eminent Experts
on Ethics in Food and Agriculture noted “the Panel unanimously stated
that the ‘terminator seeds’ generally are unethical, finding it unacceptable
to market seeds.”111
Experts are also concerned about human and animal health; the
introduction of one or more genes from completely unrelated organisms
might produce toxins or allergens in the final food product.112 Plant genetic
engineers desirous of creating a terminator gene and expressing it in a plant
would take the promoter from a gene normally activated late in seed
development and fuse that promoter to the coding sequence of a protein that
will kill an embryo going through the last stages of development.113 The
engineers often use a promoter from a cotton gene, which is toxic, so when
this gene is embedded to create terminator technology, the final crop may
not be edible to either humans or animals because of the increased toxicity
of the seeds.114 There are potential changes to the nutritional contents and
value of the seeds that have had several proteins in them destroyed by
artificially induced toxic agents.115 The toxins in these seeds may cause
allergic reactions, particularly if they are mixed up in the general food
supply chain without adequate warning or notice to the public.116
In order to activate the toxin gene in seeds with terminator technology,
the germinating seeds are soaked in antibiotics, such as tetracycline, before
110. Mgbeoji, supra note 88, at 103.
111. Id. at 115 n.77.
112. Karky & Perry, supra note 38, at 17. Soybeans, for example, are low in
the amino acids methionine and cysteine, so people whose diets are soybeanbased face a nutritional deficiency. Researchers responded by transferring a gene
from Brazil nuts which codes for large amounts of these acids. While they initially
saw a great opportunity, these researchers were ultimately disappointed by the
fact that the protein was also an allergen.
113. Mgbeoji, supra note 88, at 101.
114. Id. at 119.
115. Id.
116. Id.; see Convention on Biological Diversity, Consequences of the Use of the
New Technology for the Control of Plant Gene Expression for the Conservation and
Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/4/9/Rev.1
(May 17, 1999).
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the seeds are sold to the farmers.117 Throughout this process, there is a lot
of tetracycline to handle and dispose, and large-scale agricultural uses of
antibiotics are already seen as a threat to the overall well-being of
society.118 Further, soil ecology can suffer due to the increased tolerance
of bacteria, residual, or waste antibiotics.119
D. Summary of Balancing
There is no clear and undisputed scientific evidence that GM products
are either good or bad for human, animal, and plant health and life.120 Not
all genetically modified organisms are inherently “evil,” yet the potential
unknown harms of GM crops embedded with terminator technology are
cause for concern. The risk of cross-pollination is most concerning because
once crops with the terminator gene are planted in an open air environment,
there is no way to prevent cross-pollination of that destructive gene.
Unfortunately, there is no international mechanism to deal with the
danger that accompanies GM crops embedded with terminator technology.
It is too unrealistic to expect each individual country to recognize and
mitigate this danger on its own.121 Since it is impractical to confront this
issue on a country-by-country basis, an international regime would be the
ideal solution. Yet, knowing that such a vast international change may be
difficult and time-consuming, nation-by-nation action is still beneficial
and will hopefully encourage other countries to follow suit.
II. PATENTS AS INCENTIVES
A. Patent Theory
Since the government generally rejects raw natural material for patent
approval, scientists are unable to receive patents for agriculture until they
can prove that the food was truly “man-made” through genetic engineering.
117. Mgbeoji, supra note 88, at 101.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Karky & Perry, supra note 38, at 17.
121. Even if a country recognizes this danger and sees fit to rid their land of this
technology, the elimination process would not be easy. The lack of hard evidence,
combined with the limited political desires to implement such a regime, adds
difficulty. Countries could seek to ban all types of patents, but doing so would
remove the incentive for scientists to research and develop beneficial inventions.
Alternatively, countries could seek to ban all GMOs, but, again, that would be too
unrealistic to implement, as there are some GMOs that offer benefits to society.
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Today, one of the main motivations for developers of GM crops is the
promise of patent protection and control, even if only for a limited period
of time. Patents are a type of indirect funding for genetically engineered
agriculture in that they provide incentives for parties to undertake
expensive and risky research; they also induce upfront funding of projects
with the expectation that monopoly profits can be generated over the long
term.122
The quick-paced development process of GM crops leaves little time
to fully determine the potential harms of releasing these seeds into the
environment. Once harmful GM crops are released into the environment
on a broad scale, their potential impact is unknown, and any chance to
reverse any resulting environmental degradation dramatically decreases.
B. The History of Plant Patenting, Biotechnology, and Genetically
Modified Crops
1. The Global Development of Biotechnology
Biotechnology, as defined by the United Nation’s Convention of
Biological Diversity, is “any technological application that uses biological
systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make or modify
products or processes for specific use.”123 The CBD acknowledges an
implicit value in nature itself, recognizing: “biological diversity is about
more than plants, animals, and microorganisms and their ecosystems – it
is about people and our need for food security, medicines … and [a]
healthy environment in which to live.”124
2. Plant Patents in the United States
Until 1930, plants and seeds were not considered patentable material in
the United States because they were a product of nature and therefore not
amenable to the written description requirement for patents.125 This changed
in 1930 when Congress passed the Plant Protection Act (PPA), which
granted patent rights to plant breeders as long as the plant met the three
eligibility requirements of a patent: novelty, utility, and non-obviousness.126
122. Margo A. Bagley, Patents First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and
Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 W M .& MARY L. REV. 469, 474 (2003).
123. United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity art. 3, June 5, 1992,
31 U.N.T.S. 818.
124. Strauss, supra note 20, at 308.
125. Stein, supra note 89, at 164-65.
126. See U.S. Plant Patent Act of 1930, 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2003).
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For forty years, the PPA served as the only source of intellectual property
rights for inventions that contained living matter, but these rights only
extended to asexually reproduced plants.127 Congress enacted the Plant
Variety Protection Act (PVPA) in 1970, which gave plant breeders twenty
years of patent protection for any plant variety that is new, distinct,
uniform, and stable; this protection, though, came with a few
exceptions.128 The series of biotech patenting cases that followed in the
1980s and 1990s expanded the legal boundaries of patentable living matter
but also narrowed the traditional seed-saving exemption codified by the
PPA.129
3. Patenting Genetically Modified Organisms
As the creation and production of biotechnology products has rapidly
grown, courts in the U.S. and all over the world have been confronted with
issues regarding whether these organisms should qualify for patent
protection. In the landmark case Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that a live, genetically engineered
microorganism came within the scope of patentable subject matter under
35 U.S.C. § 101.130 The Court declared that “anything under the sun that
is made by man” is patentable.131 In Ex Parte Hibberd, the U.S. Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences held that the PPA and PVPA were not
the only sources of patent protection for plants.132 The broad category of
utility patents also allowed plant patents. Currently in the United States,
most biotechnology applications are pursued under utility rather than plant
patents.133
127. Id.
128. The PVPA did not allow protection for seeds saved by farmers and seeds
used for research purposes. Strauss, supra note 20, at 293.
129. Stein, supra note 89, at 166; see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303 (1980).
130. Diamond, 447 U.S. 303. 35 U.S.C. § 101 states: “Whoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”
131. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 309.
132. Ex Parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (1985).
133. Lara E. Ewens, Seedwars: Biotechnology, Intellectual Property, and the
Quest for High Yield Seeds, 23 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 285, 293 (2000).
Instead of only protecting the plant, utility patents make protection of plant genes
possible, as well as allow the breeder to protect the use of the genetic material of
a number of plants and to protect for multiple uses such as pharmaceutical, pest
protection, and herbicide resistance.
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In 1986, the United States allowed the first patent covering a
genetically engineered variety of corn that was modified to have increased
nutritional value.134 By 1996, the first patented genetically modified and
commercially-grown food crops were planted in America.135 The Supreme
Court confirmed patentability of plants and seeds in the U.S. in J.E.M. Ag
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., which emphasized that “the
relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but between
products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions.”136
4. History of Patenting Genetically Modified Crops Around the
World
The U.S. has taken a more lenient position than Canada or the
European Union (EU) in allowing patents of plants and plant varieties.
Over time, the U.S. consistently expanded its definition of patentable plant
material, while the EU has expressed more caution. A major goal of the
United States during the TRIPS negotiations was to obtain comprehensive
intellectual property protection for its agricultural biotechnology industry.137
In 2004, the EU enacted a fundamentally revised legal system for
regulating GMOs, which served as the foundation of the EU’s policies of
tight safety standards and freedom of choice for consumers and farmers.138
Canada does not consider animals and plants—genetically modified or
otherwise—to constitute subject matter statutorily eligible for patent
protection.139
C. Considering Morality
1. The Development of the Morality Doctrine
Under early American case law, courts developed and applied a
doctrine of “moral utility,” which rejected patents for inventions that were
considered “injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of

134. Lopez, supra note 25.
135. Stein, supra note 89, at 164.
136. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 130
(2001) (quoting Diamond, 447 U.S. at 313) (upholding the patentability of hybrid
corn seed and newly developed plant breeds).
137. Straub, supra note 42, at 187.
138. JOANN CHIRICO, GLOBALIZATION: PROSPECT AND PROBLEMS 420 (2013).
139. Torrance, supra note 29, at 265.
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society.”140 Later, in Juicy Whip v. Orange Bang, the Federal Circuit held
that a product’s deceptive nature has no effect on its utility, and therefore,
its patentability.141 In place of the concept of negative utility, courts support
a concept of beneficial or nominal utility; a nominal showing of any
beneficial use is enough for patentability in the U.S.,142 regardless of
arguably negative effects.143 Over time, courts rejected the past practice of
denying patentability on the grounds of morality, such as with gambling
devices, or because the invention might injure health, such as with drug
safety.144 Instead, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
primarily considers the positive utility of the invention, employing a “patent
first, ask questions later” approach.145 Through employment of this method,
the U.S. has decided to issue patents to all useful inventions, even if they
could have potential to create a hazard.146
On the other hand, the EU exercises extreme caution when it comes to
patenting potentially hazardous inventions, taking the “ask questions first,
then patent” approach.147 There are numerous other countries with statutory
provisions allowing inventions to be excluded from patentability on the basis
of morality; thus, it is not surprising that in the TRIPS negotiations, this large
group of countries was able to incorporate a morality provision into the
agreement despite opposition from the United States.148
2. Application of the Morality Doctrine in the United States
A combination of the demise of the moral utility doctrine and the
expansive judicial interpretations of the scope of patent-eligible subject
140. Carolyn Abbot & David Booton, Using Patent Law’s Teaching Function
to Introduce an Environmental Ethic into the Process of Technical Innovation, 21
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 219, 227 (2009).
141. Juicy Whip v. Orange Bang, 292 F.3d 728, 745 (2002).
142. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
143. Harper, supra note 17, at 414.
144. Id.; see generally Ex Parte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. 801 (Bd. App. 1977)
(declaring a slot machine patentable despite the fact that gambling devices are
generally harmful to the morals of the public); see also Application of Anthony,
414 F.2d 1383 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (holding that an anti-depressant drug satisfies the
usefulness requirement despite the fact that it causes some unwanted side effects).
145. Bagley, supra note 122.
146. The only exception to this general rule is found in the American Invents
Act, passed in 2011, which prohibits the issuing of patents on a claim directed to
or encompassing a human organism. See American Invents Act, § 33 (125 Stat.
284) (2011).
147. Bagley, supra note 122, at 480.
148. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 27.2.
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matter has resulted in virtually no basis on which the USPTO or U.S.
courts can deny patent protection to morally controversial, but otherwise
patentable, subject matter.149 Instead, patent applicants and scientific
inventors are deciding matters of public policy through the contents of the
applications they file with the USPTO.150 Some experts argue that denying
patents on morally controversial inventions will not stop the underlying
research that is the source of public apprehension.151 While morally
controversial inventions may cause temporary ethical concern, these
experts believe that, in the end, the underlying research could reap beneficial
results.152 Failing to grant patents on promising technology because of
public misunderstandings of science may hinder important discoveries and
deny life-saving cures to millions of people.153 Yet, when it comes to the
dangerous terminator technology, it is necessary for individual countries to
take steps toward determining that these inventions are immoral and
therefore do not meet the basic requirements for patenting.
D. Patents are Beneficial to Society
Patents are beneficial to society because they encourage innovation
and progress. By offering exclusive use and distribution of an invention
for a period of time, patents reward inventors with funding they can use
for research and development of future beneficial inventions. Countries
149. Bagley, supra note 122, at 470.
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., Thomas A. Magnani, The Patentability of Human-Animal
Chimeras, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 443, 459 (1999) (“The ethical concerns . . .
about biotechnology inventions do not actually relate to the patenting of such
inventions, but to whether these inventions should be created at all.”); see also
Carrie F. Walker, Beyond the Harvard Mouse: Current Patent Practice and the
Necessity of Clear Guidelines in Biotechnology Patent Law, 73 IND. L.J. 1025,
1026 (1998) (arguing that eventually, it will become apparent that the root of the
debate about patents for biotechnology has less to do with patent law and more to
do with fundamental concerns about the science itself).
152. Magnani, supra note 151.
153. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms:
The Patent System and Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 1051, 1075
(1988) (arguing that patents on new technology should be granted, reserving the
right to regulate specific applications; “this is the only sensible course”); Keith
Schneider, Harvard Gets Mouse Patent, A World First, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13,
1988, at A22 (quoting then-Commissioner of Patents Donald J. Quigg as citing
the transgenic mouse's potential to hasten the development of cancer treatments
as an important factor in granting the patent and saying, “but how can anybody
say this kind of development is unethical or wrong?”).
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should continue to allow the issuance of patents for most beneficial GM
crops, but countries should also have the ability to cut off the incentives
for the development of GM crops embedded with terminator technology.
Once these crops are no longer patentable, the economic value of developing
such inventions diminishes, leading inventors to seek development of more
beneficial agriculture technology instead. It is best to allow countries to
refuse patenting of terminator technology, which is justified by the TRIPS
Agreement, an international agreement that already has such a refusal
mechanism in place.
III. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
In 1994, the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT)154 officially recognized that there is a relationship between
free trade and environmental quality. GATT created the TRIPS Agreement
with the intent to unify international intellectual property rights as a step
towards the liberalization of trade.155 Twenty-two years later, many
questions are still unanswered regarding the implications of this Agreement.
To best protect the future of the environment on a global level, a clear
international interpretation of this Agreement is necessary.
A. The Creation and Purpose of the TRIPS Agreement
Before TRIPS, the preeminent authority pertaining to international
patent law was the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, but this Convention was mainly procedural.156 At that time,
countries basically had freedom to create their own rules and regulations
regarding the power to patent. International patent law changed when the
1994 Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations resulted in both the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and the TRIPS Agreement. TRIPS, a
combination and expansion of multiple forms of pre-existing intellectual
property standards, was the first multinational agreement to address these
issues, including the scope of international intellectual property rights, the
154. The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations 17, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144.
155. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, pmbl. (explaining the desire “to reduce
distortions and impediments to international trade”).
156. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883,
21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. The Paris Convention entrusted the protection
of industrial creations primarily to the various kinds recognized by the laws of the
countries of the Union.
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means to enforce those rights, dispute resolution, the applicability of
earlier international agreements, and transitional arrangements.157
One of the most controversial aspects of the Uruguay Round of GATT
negotiations was the United States’ insistence in intellectual property
jurisdiction based on the goals articulated for its own private interests.158
The goals of both the most-developed and least-developed countries were
codified in the TRIPS Agreement. This Agreement harmonizes and
strengthens international intellectual property protection by protecting
technological inventions that meet general conditions, provided they do not
fall within the few exceptions for inventions that are contrary to the
Member State’s morals.159 There was sufficient support among the GATT
member nations to include this restrictive provision in Article 27.2, even
though it is contrary to the municipal law of the United States and other
industrial countries.160
1. Implementation of the TRIPS Agreement
Article 7 of TRIPS mentions that the protections and enforcement of
intellectual property rights should contribute to social and economic
welfare.161 By linking intellectual property rights to trade, the WTO made
compliance with TRIPS mandatory for member countries.162 Under
Article 16.4 of the WTO agreement and Article 1.1 of the TRIPS
157. Harper, supra note 17, at 391; see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, pmbl.
158. See generally Susan K. Sell, Industry Strategies for Intellectual Property
and Trade: The Quest for TRIPS, and Post-TRIPS Strategies, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 79 (2002). Throughout 1985 and 1986, lobbyists pressed the
government to follow through with trade pressure to force countries to increase their
protection of intellectual property rights. The lobbyists expressed their sentiments
more formally through the report of the Advisory Committee for Trade
Negotiations’ Task Force on IP Right, a task force including the CEO of IBM, John
Opel, Vice President and Counsel of the Motion Picture Industry Association, Fritz
Attaway, and President of the International Division of Merck & Company, Inc. (at
that time, America's largest pharmaceutical corporation), Abraham Cohen.
159. Cripps, supra note 34, at 131.
160. Although early U.S. patent law embraced the concept of negative utility,
modern cases have rejected it. In its place, courts in the twentieth century have
established a new test of utility based on whether the invention is “used or is
designed and adapted to be used to accomplish a god result.” See generally Mills
v. Industry Novelty Co., 230 F. 463 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
161. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 7.
162. J.M. Spectar, Patent Necessity: Intellectual Property Dilemmas in the
Biotech Domain & Treatment Equity for Developing Countries, 24 HOUS. J. INT'L
L. 227, 235-36 (2002).
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Agreement, WTO Member States are required to fulfill the obligation
prescribed by the Agreement in their domestic law.163 Implementation of
domestic policies regarding Article 27.2, though, is optional. Unlike the
case of compulsory licenses, which must be granted case-by-case, Article
27.2 allows each Member State to freely determine that a certain type or
category of inventions is not patentable as long as the category falls into
one of the exceptions.164
2. An Overview of the Structure of TRIPS
TRIPS contains a total of seventy-three articles, yet only two
paragraphs in a single article touch on environmental issues.165 All 159
Member States, including developing and least-developed countries, are
obligated to patent all qualified inventions and include some forms of
biotechnology law by year 2021, unless TRIPS Articles 27.2 or 27.3 or
another exception is used.166 Generally, the regulatory framework needs to
address the following areas of biotech: (1) scope of patentability of biotech
innovation; (2) commercialization of genetically modified plants, crops,
foods, and other products and scientific risk assessment; and (3) coexistence of genetically modified, conventional and organic farming.167
TRIPS established a minimum twenty-year term of protection for patents
in all WTO member countries.168
B. The Morality Doctrine as Interpreted in TRIPS
Throughout history, countries have refused to issue certain kinds of
patents due to their moral convictions. Since morality is a vague concept,
163. Karky & Perry, supra note 38, at 15. See Marrakesh Agreement, supra
note 154, art. XIV(a).
164. For example, all inventions relating to cloning of humans are patentable.
CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS,A COMMENTARY TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 291 (2007).
165. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14.
166. Karky & Perry, supra note 38, at 15. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Extension of the 'Transition Period under
Art. 66.1 for Least Developed Country Members, WTO Doc. IP/C/64 (June 11,
2013), https://perma.cc/R2LE-4H2D (providing least-developed countries an
extended transitional period up to 2013 to fulfill TRIPS obligations. Now this
transitional period has been extended to July 1, 2021.).
167. Karky & Perry, supra note 38, at 16 n.59.
168. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, at 314. Article 33 states, “[t]he
term of protection available shall not end before the expiration of a period of
twenty years counted from the filing date.”
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its definition is dependent on national perceptions by patent offices or
judges.169 In the TRIPS Agreement, the only avenue available for Member
States to legislate regarding a patent with immoral character is through
Article 27. Morality is important to interpretation of Article 27.2 because
it allows the individual culture and customs of each country to be
considered.
1. Other Countries’ Approaches to the Morality Doctrine
Countries that have taken “ask questions first, then patent” approaches
to morally controversial subject matter provide an illustrative alternative
to the haphazard course the U.S. is currently pursuing.170 The Canadian
Supreme Court demonstrated this approach in its 2002 decision that
excluded higher life forms from patent protection, since there was no
express statutory authorization for protection from Parliament.171 Yet, in
2004, the Supreme Court of Canada seemed to take a conflicting route
when it extended protection to a patent that claimed genes and cells but
not a plant per se.172 This case presented a way for manufacturers of GM
crops in Canada, such as Monsanto Canada, to gain patent protection for
the genetically modified components of their plants, even if they could not
receive protection for the plant as a whole. On the other hand, India has
taken advantage of the patent exception provided in TRIPS Article 27.3
by refusing to allow pharmaceutical patents.173 In efforts to reduce costs
by allowing the production of generic drugs, India has chosen a patent
system that brings the most benefit to its citizens.174
2. The EPO’s Balancing Test
When considering morality, the Examining Division of the European
Patent Office (EPO) employs a balancing test, noting that “[f]or each
individual invention [involving higher life forms] the question of morality
has to be examined and possible detrimental effects and risks have to be
169. CORREA, supra note 164, at 288.
170. Bagley, supra note 122, at 480.
171. See Harvard Coll. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R.
45 (Can.) (considering the patentability of the Harvard Oncomouse under the
Patent Act, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the Oncomouse and higher life
forms in general are not patentable subject matter in Canada).
172. Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902.
173. John LaMattina, India’s Solution to Drug Costs: Ignore Patents and Control
Prices – Except For Home Grown Drugs, FORBES (Apr. 8, 2013), https://perma.cc
/Y74V-7CC8.
174. Id.
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weighed and balanced against the merits and advantages aimed at.”175 One
problem with the test is that the Examining Division never defined morality
or stated a basis, other than instructions from the Technical Board, for
choosing those particular factors to balance as opposed to other possible
concerns.176 Different bodies within the EPO articulated two additional
morality tests: the unacceptability test and the public abhorrence test.177
According to Article 53(a) of the European Patent Convention (EPC),
inventions are to be excluded from patentability as being contrary to
morality if the exploitation of that invention is not in conformity with the
conventionally accepted standards of conduct pertaining to this culture.178
In Greenpeace v. Plant Genetic Systems, the EPO concluded that none of
the claims in the patent violated this morality provision of Article 53(a)
because they concerned activities (such as production of plants and seeds)
and products (plant cells, plants, and seeds) which cannot be considered to
be morally wrong.179 The EPO Board ignored the more specific concerns
regarding the patent’s subject matter and focused only on the general type
of products and activities the patent concerned.180 Today, TRIPS Article
27.2 seems to be the most natural path through which countries can
demonstrate the morality balancing test as applied to genetically modified
crops with terminator technology.
IV. INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 27.2
A. Interpreting TRIPS Article 27.2 in an Effort to Protect the
Environment
When it comes to interpreting the TRIPS Agreement in an effort to
protect the environment, much is unclear. For example, TRIPS authorizes
the patenting of plants and animals,181 but it fails to discuss how nations
might prevent the destruction of biodiversity.182 According to the
175. Harvard/Onco-mouse, [1990] E.P.O.R. 501, 527.
176. Bagley, supra note 122, at 521.
177. Howard Florey/Relaxin, [1995] E.P.O.R. 541 (Opposition Div.); Lubrizol
Hybrid Plants, [1988] E.P.O.R. 173 (Tech. Bd. App.).
178. Harvard/Onco-mouse, [1995] E.P.O.R. 357, 366 (Tech Bd. App.).
179. Id. at 370.
180. Bagley, supra note 122, at 523.
181. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 27.3; see also Jennifer Schultz, The
GATT/ WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment – Toward Environmental
Reform, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 423, 436-37 (1995).
182. “Biological diversity” means the variability among living organisms from
all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems
and the ecological complexes of which they are a part; this includes diversity
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fundamental principle of international treaty interpretation set out in the
Vienna Convention, a treaty and the meaning of a term in that treaty shall
be determined in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
term in its context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty.183
TRIPS accommodates the American view that “anything under the sun
made by man” is patent-eligible, as well as the views of many other
countries that deny patents on morally controversial inventions.184
There are no clear guidelines or standards to use when interpreting the
TRIPS Agreement in its entirety. The plain meaning of the statutory
language suggests a State may exclude an invention from patent protection
if prevention of “commercial exploitation” of that invention in their
territory is “necessary” in order to “protect ordre public or morality.”185
So far, each Member State has been free to interpret each of these phrases
as it sees fit, but there is no evidence that any countries have taken
advantage of Article 27.2 in efforts to avoid prejudice to the environment.
A universal interpretation needs to be declared so that the Agreement is
implemented in similar fashion around the world. There is no official
interpretation of Article 27.2 of TRIPS as a whole, but several experts
consider 27.2 to be analogous to Articles XX(a) and XX(b) of GATT.186
In order to derive the most logical interpretation of Article 27.2, each
phrase must be analyzed separately.
1. The Geographic Limitations of Article 27.2
The plain meaning of Article 27.2 suggests risks to ordre public or
morality must come from the commercial exploitation of the inventions
and not the invention in itself.187 While one isolated use of harmful
technology may have little impact on the environment as a whole, once
aggregated through commercialization, the impact greatly increases. Article
27.2 does not intend to prevent the creation of every single invention that
poses a potential risk to ordre public, but rather seeks to allow countries to
align their patent law with a regime for preventing the commercial
exploitation of such inventions. The phrase “within [a Member’s] territory”
within species, between species, and of ecosystems. United Nations Convention
on Biological Diversity, supra note 123.
183. Shim, supra note 51, at 224 n.367.
184. Bagley, supra note 122, at 530.
185. Timothy G. Ackermann, Dis’ordre’ly Loopholes: TRIPS Patent
Protection, GATT, and the ECJ, 32 TEX. INT’L L.J. 489, 492 (1997).
186. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 154.
187. Chris R. Byrnes, Patenting Life: TRIPS Article 27 & Bolivia’s Proposal to
Ban the Patenting of all Life Forms, 24 GEO. INT’L ENVT’L. L. REV. 245, 258 (2012).
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also suggests that the impact of the risk must be within the territory of the
concerned Member and not that of another.188 This language creates an
environmental protectionism issue because a Member State could implement
policies regarding protection of the environment, yet still be negatively
affected by a neighboring state’s lack of such policy. Over time, these
conflicting policies can lead to negative impacts on the environment, even in
the Member States that have banned commercial exploitation and patenting.
To best prepare for the future, a more comprehensive interpretation of
Article 27.2 is needed.
2. Members May Exclude Patents When “Necessary”
A Member State may exclude an invention from patentability if it
finds exclusion “necessary” to prevent commercial exploitation of that
invention in order to protect ordre public or morality.189 TRIPS gives little
guidance when allowing each Member State to decide for itself whether
or not the prevention of commercial exploitation of any particular
invention fulfills the definition of “necessary.”190
Articles XX(a) and XX(b) of the GATT exceptions parallel the
structure of Article 27.2 with use of the language “necessary to protect
public morals” and “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life and
health.”191 Beyond acknowledging this parallel structure, GATT dispute
resolution does not provide much guidance as to the interpretation of
“necessary.”192 Patent restrictions would be considered “necessary” in
terms of Article XX(b) only if there were no alternative measures through
which a contracting party could reasonably be expected to achieve its
policy objectives.193 Similar to the Article XIV(a) exception in United
States v. Gambling, Article 27.2 of TRIPS requires a “necessity” test for
its exceptions.194 Therefore, when determining if the exclusion of a
biotechnology patent is “necessary,” a Member State should consider any
188. Id.
189. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art 27.2.
190. Ackermann, supra note 185, at 493.
191. Byrnes, supra note 187, at 254; see also Harper, supra note 17, at 400-02;
UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 378 (2005).
192. Ackermann, supra note 185.
193. Robert Weissman, A Long Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry
Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO
Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
1069, 1103-05 (1996) (discussing the tests and concluding that they are the same).
194. Byrnes, supra note 187. “Members may exclude from patentability
inventions, the prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of
which is necessary to protect ” TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 27.2.
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alternatives to excluding the patent and the impact of such alternatives, and
then it should compare the impact of the alternatives to the impact of the
proposed patent.
3. To Protect Ordre Public
Originally from the French Law,195 the term ordre public is related to
the concept of public policy as used in Anglo-American doctrine.196 The
concept of ordre public has been derived from “public order” or “public
interest” or “wellbeing of the society,” and has been incorporated into
patent legislation in some jurisdictions like the European Union and the
United States.197 WTO Member States have considerable flexibility in
defining the concept depending upon each country’s social values.198
a. Considering Ordre Public
Member States may only exclude an invention on the basis of ordre
public where the failure to provide such protection results in exploitation
or an offense against the forum’s concept of fundamental norms.199 For
example, some countries have expressed the belief that all life forms are
sacred and should not be owned through traditional property rights.200
195. “Community common sense and common conscience, extended and applied
throughout the state to matters of public morals, health, safety, welfare ....... ” Orde
Public, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
196. “Courts will not enforce contracts the performance of which would
contravene fundamental moral principles ...... or which would offend against some
other overriding public interest.” M. Forde, The “Ordre Public” Exception and
Adjudicative Jurisdiction Conventions, 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 259 (1980).
197. Asanka Perera, The TRIPS Agreement and Protection of Plant Varieties:
A More Intense Scrutiny, 18 SRI LANKA J. INT’L L. 223, 230 (2006).
198. Id.
199. Ackermann, supra note 185, at 496.
200. For example, Brazil and Thailand refused to recognize pharmaceutical patents
but relinquished under pressure by the United States. See, e.g., Thammasat Resolution,
Dec. 5, 1997, https://perma.cc/NSS8-Z9QC (organizational representatives from 19
countries—including Thailand, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Ecuador, Columbia,
Indonesia, Philippines, India, South Africa, and Zambia—opposing the privatization of
biodiversity, life forms, and traditional knowledge by TRIPS with nonbinding
resolution); see also Sean D. Murphy, Biotechnology and International Law, 42 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 47, 65 (2001) (discussing the belief of some developing states that life forms
“were considered special and different and not reducible to property rights that might be
possessed by some and denied to others”); COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS,
INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 5-6
(2002), https://perma.cc/GGQ5-6E88 (criticizing “the patenting of life forms on ethical
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TRIPS provides a non-exhaustive list of acceptable justifications, including
protection of human, animal, or plant life or health and avoidance of serious
prejudice to the environment.201
Arguably, a country could try to resist granting biotechnology patents
through Article 27.2 on the grounds of strong public interest or to protect
human health and the environment. However, a similar argument was
unsuccessful in the Harvard Oncomouse case decided by the EPC.202
While the WTO standards and EPC standards do not always align, the
standards could be applied in an analogous manner. When researchers
from Harvard Medical School sought patent protection for a mouse that
was genetically modified to be highly susceptible to cancer, the application
raised ethical concerns.203 In considering this patent, the EPO discussed
whether patents should be extended to life forms as a whole, particularly
for higher-order animals such as mammals.204 While the United States
quickly granted the patent for the mouse in 1988, the EPO took longer to
analyze the dilemma but reached its final decision in 2004.205 The EPO
applied Article 53(a) of the European Patent Convention and developed a
utilitarian balancing test, assessing the potential benefits of the claimed
invention against negative aspects.206 In this particular case, the EPC
weighed the suffering of the mice against the expected benefits to
humanity through new cancer research techniques. Ultimately, the patent
was granted, setting the precedent that any patent on a living organism is
found not to be contrary to ordre public or morality under EPC principles.
When considering whether terminator technology is contrary to ordre
public, countries must employ this utilitarian balancing test.

grounds” because “private ownership of substances created by nature is wrong, and
inimical to cultural values in different parts of the world”).
201. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 27.2.
202. Strauss, supra note 20, at 307.
203. Harvard/Onco-mouse, [1992] O.J. E.P.O.R. 588, 593 (Examining Div.).
204. Id. at 588.
205. U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 to Harvard College claiming “a transgenic
non-human mammal whose germ cells and somatic cells contain a recombinant
activated oncogene sequence introduced into said mammal ”
206. Bioethics and Patent Law: The Case of the Oncomouse, WIPO MAGAZINE,
Mar. 2006, http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2006/03/article_0006.html.
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b. Using the Balancing Test to Determine Whether a Patent is
Contrary to Ordre Public
The European Board of Appeal in its earlier Harvard Oncomouse
decision adopted the balancing exercise, or utilitarian approach.207 Courts
have interpreted “serious prejudice” to include either actual or potential
harm, so countries must consider both in attempt to accomplish a holistic
review.208 Whenever an invention involves higher life forms, the question
of morality has to be examined and possible detrimental effects and risks
have to be weighed against the merits and advantages.209 When later
considering the patent in Greenpeace, however, the Board expressly
declined to employ the balancing test used in the Oncomouse decision,
noting that it “was not the only way of assessing patentability” under
Article 53(a) but was “just one possible way.”210 In that case, the decision
as to whether Article 53(a) was a bar to patenting the plant invention at
issue depended mainly on a careful weighing of the suffering of animals
and possible risks to the environment on the one hand and the invention’s
usefulness to mankind on the other.211
c. In Comparison to GATT
Examination of case history from GATT Article XX and GATS Article
XIV can help determine the scope of Article 27.2 of TRIPS.212 Because
protection of the environment falls under the umbrella term of ordre public
or morality, the primary analogue to GATT and GATS is best analyzed
under the “public morals” exceptions of GATT Article XX(a) and GATS
207. See Harvard/Onco-mouse, [1990] O.J. E.P.O.R 451 (Examining Div.);
Harvard/Onco-mouse, [1990] E.P.O.R. 501; Harvard/Onco-mouse, [1990] O.J.
E.P.O.R. 490 (TBA); Harvard/Onco-mouse, [1991] E.P.O.R. 525 (Examining Div.).
208. CORREA, supra note 164, at 99-101.
209. Harvard/Onco-mouse, [1990] E.P.O.R. 501, 527.
210. Bagley, supra note 122, at 523.
211. Plant Cells/Plant Genetic Systems, [1995] O.J. E.P.O.R. 545 (TBA)
(Reasons ¶ 9).
212. Byrnes, supra note 187, at 254 n.55. GATT Article XX and GATS Article
XIV provide important exceptions for public policy, public health, environmental,
and public emergency concerns to all of the provisions covered in each of the
respective agreements. The ability to apply jurisprudence from an exceptions
clause of one agreement to an exceptions clause of another is supported by the
notion that each of these agreements is designed with the same economic policy
goals in mind. Accordingly, derogation from these economic policy goals can be
substantiated under similar lines of reasoning supported by the exceptions clauses
of each agreement.
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Article XIV(a). These provisions deal with exceptions from patenting
necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order, which
extends to protection of human, animal, or plant life or avoidance of serious
prejudice to the environment.213 GATT Article XX(a) and GATS Article
XIV(a) cases should be read to include the same concerns under a TRIPS
Article 27.2 analysis.214
d. In Comparison with the European Patent Commission
In general, the EPO has narrowly construed exceptions to patentability
in the EPC, particularly with respect to plant and animal varieties.215 Similar
to Article 27.2 of TRIPS, Article 53(a) of the EPC provides that European
patents shall not be granted in “respect of inventions the publication or
exploitation of which would be contrary to ordre public or morality,
provided that the exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely
because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the Contracting
States.”216 Unlike TRIPS Article 27.2, this provision is mandatory.217
Today, inventions that cause serious prejudice to the environment can
be considered contrary to ordre public, as the European Patent Office
Board of Appeal held in Plant Genetic Systems.218 In this decision, the
EPO considered the patentability of a plant that had been genetically
modified to be resistant to glutamine synthetase inhibitors, a type of
herbicide.219 In the reasons for its decision, the EPO stated that inventions
likely to seriously prejudice the environment are contrary to ordre public
and should be excluded from patentability220 as long as threat to the
environment is sufficiently substantiated at the time the decision is taken by
the EPO.221 There is no specific reference in Article 53(c) to the protection
of the environment, likely because this concern had not yet emerged at the
213. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 154, art. XIV(a).
214. Byrnes, supra note 187, at 255.
215. Plant Cells/Plant Genetic Systems, [1995] O.J. E.P.O.R. 545 (TBA)
(Reasons ¶ 8).
216. Estaelle Derclaye, Intellectual Property Rights & Global Warming, 12
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 263, 273 (2008). See generally Convention on the Grant of
European Patents art. 53, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 276, https://treaties.un.org/doc
/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201065/volume-1065-I-16208-English.pdf.
217. Derclaye, supra note 216.
218. Plant Cells/Plant Genetic Systems, [1995] O.J. E.P.O.R. 545 (TBA)
(Reasons ¶ 5).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Plant Cells/Plant Genetic Systems, [1995] O.J. E.P.O.R. 545 (TBA)
(Reasons ¶ 18.5).
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time the provision was adopted in 1973; the Plant Genetic Systems ruling
shows that protection of the environment can now be read into its
interpretation.222
4. And to Avoid “Serious Prejudice to the Environment”
Inventions that prejudice the environment can be considered contrary
to ordre public, but it is not clear how extensive the prejudice must be
before a country can exclude such subject matter from patentability.223 The
text of Article 27.2 requires the prejudice to be serious, but this standard
is still imprecise. The seriousness may be actual or potential since Article
27.2 does not distinguish between the two.224 The “avoiding serious
prejudice” provision appears to have emerged out of jurisprudence on
exceptions to patentable subject matter under the EPC. This provision
deviates from the EPC and European Directive by including the phrases
“protecting human, animal or plant life or health” and “avoiding serious
prejudice to the environment” as examples of “ordre public and morality.”
This wording takes a meaningful step forward in accounting for
environmental factors. It is unquestionable that biological diversity concerns
both protecting “human, animal or plant life or health” and “avoiding
serious prejudice to the environment.”225
B. Applying Article 27.2 to Genetically Modified Crops
The fact that the TRIPS Agreement does not expressly address
genetically modified products may result in inconsistent application,
particularly concerning patents for living organisms, engineered gene
materials, or the legal status of genetically modified crops. Moreover,
incorporation of intellectual property issues into the trade-oriented TRIPS
Agreement has led to ambiguity in interpretation of the treaty norms.226 The
best way to determine whether the ordre public benefits of genetically
modified crops outweigh the potential prejudice to the environment is to
employ the balancing test used by the European Patent Council in the
Harvard Oncomouse case. When applied, this balancing test results in the
conclusion that the benefits of GM crops with terminator technology do
not outweigh the burden that the technology puts on society. Even without

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Derclaye, supra note 216.
Id. at 272.
Id.
Shim, supra note 51, at 224-25.
Murphy, supra note 200, at 68-69.
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comprehensive facts outlining the full impact of this technology, the
potential consequences are too great to risk.
V. SOLUTIONS
A. Current Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
If a dispute arises regarding a country’s decision to exclude an
invention from patentability according to TRIPS, the Dispute Settlement
Body may scrutinize that decision.227 In the European Union, Member
States may invoke a safeguard provision and temporarily ban a GMO
product if it is possibly harmful to human health or the environment.228
This is not a sufficient solution because other countries that trade with
Europe are constantly pressuring the EU to lower its safety standards to
allow for easier trade.
B. Proposed Alternate Solutions
Until there is more research on terminator technology to prove that it
is safe to use, such technology should be able to be banned by any WTO
Member State through universal interpretation of TRIPS Article 27.2.
There is a clear trend towards the development of issue-specific legal
mechanisms as a preferred means of dealing with environmental problems.229
The articulation of international legal principles through dispute resolution
processes is slow and gradual and cannot address issues of prevention and
collective action in the fine-grained way of law-making via treaty.230 The
often-irreversible character of environmental damage, and the limitation
of reparation after the fact, means that prevention of this damage is of the
utmost importance.231 Patent law has historically been territorial in nature,
with sovereign states granting patents and providing means for patentees
to enforce their rights only within their borders.232 A more international
227. Ackermann, supra note 185, at 493; see JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 738 (8th ed. 2012).
228. Karky & Perry, supra note 38, at 17; see also Commission Regulation
258/97, 1997 O.J. (L. 43) (EC) (“Article 12 of Regulation 258/97 allows member
states to temporarily ban products if there are ‘detailed grounds for considering
that the use of a food or a food ingredient . . . endangers human health or the
environment”’).
229. CRAWFORD, supra note 227, at 364.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 254.
232. Bagley, supra note 122, at 493; see, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000)
(remedy for infringement that occurs within the United States); see Margo A.

2018]

COMMENT

617

regime should be implemented in order to protect an environmental space
that is not constrained to borders. An effective intellectual property regime
must be international in scope.233
1. Proposed Solutions
States have a general obligation to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction respect the environment of other states and of areas beyond
national control, as affirmed by the International Court of Justice in the
Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion.234
Nations have an obligation, expressed in Principle 17 of the Rio
Declaration, to conduct an environmental impact assessment for any
proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on
the environment and are subject to a decision of a competent national
authority.235 When it comes to genetically modified technology that
spreads rapidly and replicates naturally, individual nations do not have
time to undergo this extensive safety assessment. Instead, the WTO should
consider this environmental impact assessment within the interpretation of
Article 27.2 as applied to genetically modified crops. Generally, compulsory
licenses would help improve the environment, so a clear and international
standard is necessary.236 While experts may argue that the grant or denial
of patents on microorganisms and other biotechnology is not likely to put
an end to genetic research or to its attendant risks, this debate should not
prevent Member States from taking concrete steps to prohibit further
degradation to the environment.237
2. The Precautionary Principle
It is appropriate under Article 27.2 for a nation to presume that certain
inventions pose an environmental risk.238 International law in other areas
Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The Geographical Limitation on Prior Art in
a Small World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679, 729-30 (2003) (discussing efforts to
eliminate the territoriality of U.S. and foreign patent systems); Curtis A. Bradley,
Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L.
505, 520-21 (1997) (discussing territoriality of U.S. patent law).
233. Lopez, supra note 25, at 369.
234. CRAWFORD, supra note 227, at 359.
235. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I),
Principle 17 (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
236. Derclaye, supra note 216, at 287.
237. Bagley, supra note 122, at 535.
238. Harper, supra note 17, at 417.
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recognizes this possibility through the precautionary principle, one of the
best-known principles of environmental protection.239 This provision has
been described as an attempt to codify the concept of precaution in law,
where “precaution” refers to a strategy for addressing risk.240 Principle 15
of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development states that when
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures
to prevent environmental degradation.241 Annex III of the Cartagena Protocol
on Biosafety242 declared that lack of scientific knowledge or scientific
consensus should not necessarily be interpreted as indicating a particular
level of risk, as absence of risk, or as an acceptable risk.243 Once a nation
has perceived a potential risk to the environment, it should be able to freely
act to prohibit this danger. Many times, a nation may act too late. To
protect against this risk, a nation should require a pre-market showing
from both domestic and foreign producers that an invention is safe.244
Precautionary regulation, such as that proposed in this Article, is justified
when there is no clear evidence about a particular risk scenario, when the
risk itself is uncertain, or until the risk is disproved.245 When it comes to
terminator technology, the evidence is clear: this technology can and will
damage the environment if released in great quantities.
There is wide agreement that GATT allows any contracting party to
adopt appropriate domestic environmental policies by providing countries
with very considerable scope to use trade-related policies to protect
national environmental resources without calling into question their
GATT obligations.246 Both GATT and other international laws support the
precautionary use of Article 27.2.247 GATT suggests that the interpretation
of TRIPS Article 27.2 be approached through a two-step argument: (1)
239. Crawford, supra note 227, at 357.
240. Id.
241. Rio Declaration, supra note 235.
242. “The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological
Diversity is an international agreement which aims to ensure the safe handling,
transport and use of living modified organisms (LMOs) resulting from modern
biotechnology that may have adverse effects on biological diversity, taking also
into account risks to human health. It was adopted on 29 January 2000 and entered
into force on 11 September 2003.” The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,
CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, https://perma.cc/HW2Z-F325 (last
updated Dec. 21, 2017).
243. Id.
244. Harper, supra note 17, at 417-18.
245. CRAWFORD, supra note 227, at 258.
246. Harper, supra note 17, at 418.
247. Id. at 384.
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GATT creates a rebuttable presumption supporting the use of international
industrial standards and (2) the international standards of widest applicability
endorse product life cycle management, pollution preventions, and product
impact disclosure.248
Article 27.2 is not mandatory; members have discretion to prohibit
immoral inventions.249 This provision of the TRIPS Agreement certainly
covers the scope of genetically modified plants or foods and the freedom
of the Member States to allow or not allow genetically modified products
to be brought into its market or environment if the situations warrants.250
The questions that TRIPS cannot answer include where society should
draw the line between protection that will stimulate innovation and
progress and the level of protection that will stifle beneficial research or
cause other harms.251
International intellectual property agreements alone will not provide
solutions to the difficult questions regarding gene technologies and selfreplicating inventions. TRIPS is driven by a “commodity logic,” which
aims to maximize profits for intellectual property producers.252 Given the
troubled history that developing countries have experienced with the
intellectual property system, marked especially by their historical inability
to exercise meaningful sovereignty over intellectual property standards, it
is only fair that the exceptions built into TRIPS provide broad latitude for
policy objectives.253
CONCLUSION
There is a trend towards “upward harmonization” of global intellectual
property standards, which was caused in part by underutilization of TRIPS
flexibility by all countries.254 The countries created the TRIPS Agreement

248. Id. at 403-04.
249. Derclaye, supra note 216, at 272.
250. Karky & Perry, supra note 38, at 15; see, e.g., Byrnes, supra note 187, at
254 (Bolivia’s broad notion of harmony with nature, which is embodied in the
indigenous philosophy of suma qamana, can be used to justify a ban on the
patenting of life under the ordre public or morality provisions of Article 27.2.).
251. J. Janewa Osei-Tutu, Agricultural Biotechnology: Drawing on
International Law to Promote Progress, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 531, 544 (2015).
252. Chidi Oguamanam, Regime Tension in the Intellectual Property Rights
Arena: Farmer's Rights and Post-TRIPS Counter Regime Trends, 29 DALHOUSIE
L.J. 413, 424 (2006) (quoting James Thuo Gathii, Rights, Patents, Markets and
the Global AIDS Pandemic, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 261, 309 (2002)).
253. Byrnes, supra note 187, at 265.
254. Id. at 265 n.113.
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with the main purpose of uniting countries through consistent intellectual
property standards, in the hope of making international trade easier. As it
stands now, the application of Article 27 is sloppy and varies greatly from
Member State to Member State. There is no evidence that any member has
ever used Article 27.2 to refuse patenting based on grounds of environmental
protection.
As stewards of the Earth, humans have a unique position that comes with
a duty to take care of the environment, protecting it for the next generation.
Without a clear standard to follow, the protection of the environment becomes
complicated and therefore seemingly less of a priority. The interpretation of
TRIPS Article 27.2 presented in this Article is necessary to stop the
degradation of the environment by crops embedded with terminator
technology, for the wellbeing of humans and our planet depends on it.
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